The judgment of His Honour DPJ Crawley in Smout v Return to Work Corporation of South Australia [2025] SAET 36 provides a succinct recap of the law relating to the “one assessment principle” in the context of a Permanent Impairment Assessment conducted in accordance with section 22 of the Return to Work Act 2014 (“the RTW Act”) .
The applicant had an accepted claim for an “acute stress disorder” suffered as a result of a high-speed rollover motor vehicle accident which occurred in the course of her employment on 24 June 2020.
She underwent a permanent impairment assessment in accordance with s 22 of the RTW Act performed by Dr Nick Ford, Psychiatrist. Dr Ford assessed the applicant’s permanent impairment as 45% WPI. He declined to make any deduction for pre-existing or non-related impairments.
The respondent contended that the assessment by Dr Ford was not in compliance with the Impairment Assessment Guidelines (“IAGs”). A number of criticisms were alleged by the respondent in the way Dr Ford carried out the assessment, including the failure to make a deduction for pre-existing impairment.
The respondent sought that the matter be referred to an Independent Medical Advisor (“IMA”) pursuant to s 121 of the RTW Act.
The matter was listed for trial, however, the parties agreed that the matter should be referred to an IMA. Subsequently, it became apparent that the parties were not in agreement as to the nature and extent of the referral.
The respondent contended that, it being accepted that the assessment of Dr Ford was non-compliant, that the referral to an IMA should be at large for the entire PIA to be performed afresh.
The applicant contended that the only non-compliant issue related to the question of deduction and accordingly the principle assessment of 45% should stand, with the IMA to consider the level of any deduction for pre-existing or unrelated impairments.
The parties accepted that the final form of the question or questions to be referred were to be determined by His Honour following submissions from the parties pursuant to s 121(2)(e) of the RTW Act.
The applicant submitted that by use of the expression “any” question in s 121, it was contemplated that there is no need for the whole of the PIA to be reassessed. Rather, a discrete issue can be referred. Reliance was placed upon the decision in Brooks v Return to Work SA.
His Honour considered the factual circumstances in Brooks to be quite distinct from the circumstances of this case. In Brooks, there was no challenge to the assessments made by the assessor. Rather, the assessor felt unable to determine the question of deduction.
His Honour referred to his previous decision of Eves v Return to Work Corporation in which he held that “it would offend the “one assessment” principle if the two stages in the assessment were undertaken by different practitioners”, and further that once the assessment had been determined to be non-compliant, it was not appropriate to rely upon some aspects of the assessment but not others, and that there should only be “one mind” assessing the compensable impairment by reference to the total impairment and the pre-existing impairment.
His Honour in this case, considered the question of deductibility to be an “inextricable part” of the assessment process for psychological impairment.
Accordingly, once it has been conceded that a PIA is non-compliant with the IAGs, the inevitable result is that the entire assessment must be re-undertaken to enable the court to determine the compensable whole person impairment.
Summary
In the case of Smouts, His Honour DPJ Crawley held that once it has been conceded that a PIA is non-compliant with the IAGs, the entire assessment must be re-undertaken by the Independent Medical Assessor. To have one assessor determine the overall impairment for the psychological condition, and another assessment the level of any deduction, would offend the “one assessment principle”.
